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The Rise and Fall of the Religion Clauses 
Frederick Mark Gedicks * 
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The development of the constitutional law of religion by 
the Supreme Court came at the end of a decisive shift in public 
values in the United States from Protestantism to secularism. 
From the founding era at the end of the 18th century until 
early in the 20th century, Protestant religion was thought to be 
a significant and legitimate component of American public life. 
By the 1940s, however, American public life had become largely 
secular, although large numbers of Americans remained 
committed to religion in their private lives. The Supreme 
Court's recent treatment of the religion clauses can be 
understood as the product of the Court's return to the 19th 
century relationship between church and state while retaining 
the rhetoric of 20th century secularism. 
A. The De Facto Establishment 
State religious establishments that existed during the 
founding era died a natural political death early in the 19th 
century. Even when combined with the establishment clause's 
prohibition on national establishments, however, the elimina-
tion of state establishments did not lead to a separation of 
religion from public life. Nineteenth century Americans under-
stood the Constitution to require separation of church and state 
only at the institutional level. This meant that constitutionally 
prohibited establishments of religion were created when the 
government coerced funding of a particular denomination or 
* Professor of Law, Brigham Young University. J.D., University of Southern 
California. I wish to thank Christine Stone Jepsen for excellent research assistance. 
This essay is based on a speech presented at the Brigham Young University Bill of 
Rights Symposium in September 1991, and was condensed from an interpretive 
essay on "Religion" appearing in the OXFORD CoMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT (Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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conformity to its practices, but it did not require that govern-
ment or politics be secular. Put a little more simply, 19th cen-
tury Americans considered government interaction with reli-
gion that looked like the old Anglican establishment to be a 
constitutionally prohibited establishment of religion. Converse-
ly, if an interaction didn't look like the Anglican establishment, 
then it generally wasn't considered an establishment. 1 
From shortly after the founding era until early in the 20th 
century, church-state relations in the United States were gov-
erned by what Mark De Wolfe Howe called the "de facto Protes-
tant establishment."2 The premise of the de facto establish-
ment was that Protestant values were the foundation of civi-
lized society. Accordingly, in public schools teachers led prayers 
and included scripture readings from the King James Bible in 
their lessons. Customs like legislative prayer became wide-
spread among the states, Thanksgiving, Christmas, and Easter 
were officially recognized as holidays, and political rhetoric 
made frequent reference to the Almighty.3 States enforced pro-
hibitions on blasphemy, enforced the Christian Sabbath, and 
imposed civil disabilities upon nonProtestants and (especially) 
upon nonbelievers. Towards the end of the 19th century, Prot-
estant fundamentalists in many states succeeded in passing 
temperance and anti-evolution laws. These same fundamental-
ists also were instrumental in building political support for the 
federal government's efforts in the latter part of the century to 
eradicate the Mormon practice of polygamy. 
Under the de facto establishment, religious and govern-
mental authority were aligned in a variety of ways, but always 
in a diffuse and generally nonsectarian sense. Because the de 
jure Anglican establishment of England exemplified for Ameri-
cans the kind of establishment that was prohibited by the Con-
stitution, the possibility that the more subtle alignments of 
religion and government that characterized the de facto estab-
lishment were also constitutionally prohibited was never taken 
seriously. In the minds of 19th century Americans, the separa-
tion of church and state demanded by the establishment clause 
1. THOMAS CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO 
THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 191-92 (1986). 
2. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND 
GoVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 11-15, ;n, 98 (1965). 
3. MARK TuSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CON-
STITlJTIONAL LAW 266 (1988). 
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was merely institutional. They honored that separation not 
only by refraining from establishing a national church, but also 
by having abandoned their state religious establishments. Be-
yond these measures, however, 19th century Americans saw no 
need to cabin the public influence of religion. On the contrary, 
they saw that influence as being critical to the creation and 
maintenance of civilized society.4 
B. Secular Neutrality 
The assumptions of the de facto establishment about the 
legitimacy and importance of public religious influence came 
under serious pressure early in the 20th century. Exactly how 
and why secularization came about is a complex issue. Anum-
ber of influences have been identified, including the growth of 
science, Darwin's On the Origin of the Species (1859), the 
professionalization of American higher education, and the rise 
of legal realism. 5 
Whatever its source, secularization has been a powerful 
cultural phenomenon in this century. By the 1930s, the so-
called "secularization hypothesis" was widely believed by intel-
lectuals and academics in the United States. Under this hy-
pothesis, the progressive secularization of society was seen as 
an inevitable and positive long term trend which would eventu-
ally end in the elimination of religion as a public influence. 
This hypothesis remains controversial but, as Steven Smith has 
suggested, it is wholly accurate to conclude that since the end 
of World War II, the creation of a "secular society" in the Unit-
ed States has been a genuine political and social option.6 
By the late 1940s, the de facto establishment had become 
problematic. Edward Purcell describes how in the 20th century, 
religion "emerged as the preeminent symbol of everything that 
was bad in human society," whereas science "was inextricably 
tied up in the minds of most intellectuals with everything that 
was best in human society."7 Rather than an indispensable 
foundation of civilized society, as presupposed by the de facto 
4. See FREDERICK MARK GEDDICK!S & ROGER HENDRIX, CHOOSING THE DREAM: 
THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN PuBLIC LIFE 41-45 (1991). 
5. See generally EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: 
SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBUjM OF VALUE (1973). 
6. Steven Smith, Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 
955, 975 (1989). 
7. PuRCELL, supra note 5, at 61. 
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establishment, religion had come to be seen as a reactionary 
obstacle to secular progress. 
II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
Constitutional litigation under the free exercise clause has 
largely centered on whether the clause requires that a person 
be excused from complying with laws which contradict that 
person's religious beliefs. The constitutionally compelled free 
exercise exemption permits believers to ignore any law which 
requires them to perform an act which is prohibited by their 
religious beliefs, or which prohibits them from performing any 
act which is required by their religious beliefs. 
A. The Belief-Action Doctrine 
In Reynolds v. United States,8 the Supreme Court refused 
to find a constitutionally compelled exemption for Mormon 
polygamists. Under the so-called belief-action doctrine which 
the Reynolds Court articulated, government is without constitu-
tional authority to punish a person for his or her religious be-
liefs, but has full authority to regulate religiously motivated 
actions so long as it has a rational basis for doing so. Since the 
government can always meet this light burden of justification, 
the belief-action doctrine effectively forecloses the possibility of 
constitutionally compelled exemptions. Accordingly, the belief-
action doctrine enabled state and federal government to regu-
late and even penalize any religion whose members strayed too 
far from the cultural baseline of Protestant piety under the de 
facto establishment.9 
B. The Compelling State Interest Exemption Doctrine 
Reynolds' belief-action doctrine was apparently dismantled 
by two modern decisions. In Sherbert v. Verner, 10 the Court 
ordered a state to pay unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day 
Adventist even though she would not make herself available for 
work on Saturday (her Sabbath) as required by the state's un-
employment compensation law. The state had argued that 
protecting the integrity of the unemployment insurance fund 
8. 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878). 
9. PHIUP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW: OF CHURCH AND STATE AND 
THE SUPREME COURT 21-25 (1961). 
10. 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963). 
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against depletion by those who were not really looking for work 
was a sufficient reason to deny the benefits (as it probably was 
under the rational basis standard of Reynolds). However, the 
Supreme Court in Sherbert held that government could burden 
a fundamental right like the free exercise of religion only if it 
was protecting a compelling interest by the least intrusive 
means possible, and found the state's interest insufficient to 
justify the infringement. The Court has expressly reaffirmed 
this holding on numerous occasions. 11 
In the second case, Wisconsin v. Yoder/2 the Court held 
that the Amish were not required to send their children to 
public schools past the eighth grade in violation of their reli-
gious beliefs, because the state could not show that its compel-
ling interest would be significantly undermined by granting the 
Amish an exemption from compulsory attendance laws. Where-
as Sherbert required only that the state justify the law that 
burdened free exercise by a compelling interest, Yoder required 
that the state justify its denial of an exemption to religious 
objectors by a compelling interest. Thus, the effect of Yoder was 
to raise substantially the government's burden of justifying any 
generally applicable law that incidentally burdened the free 
exercise of religion. 
Both Sherbert and Yoder are consistent with the Warren 
and Burger Courts' respective emphases on individual rights. 
Whereas Reynolds clearly assumes that society is more impor-
tant than the individual, the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine reflects 
the view that individual rights are prior to any claims that 
society as a whole may make on individual conduct. In terms of 
the 19th and 20th century models I have been discussing, the 
de facto establishment posited traditional Protestant values as 
the basis of society. Those who refused to conform to these 
values, like polygamous Mormons, were challenging the very 
foundations on which society was thought to be organized, and 
thus were not deserving of any relief from laws which burdened 
their subversive religious practices. By contrast, a regime of 
secular neutrality purports to remain aloof from the choices 
that religious Americans make in their private lives. In this 
view, the government has no business telling people how to live 
11. E.g, Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); 
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. l:-l6 (1987); Thomas v. Review 
Bd, 4fi0 U.S. 707 (1981). 
12. 406 U.S. 20fi, 2:14 (1972). 
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their moral and religious lives. Accordingly, even idiosyncratic 
religious practices that would be considered subversive under 
the assumptions of the de facto establishment are protected by 
secular neutrality unless they clearly threaten important and 
legitimate state interests, which never include enforcement of 
private morals. 
C. Erosion of the Sherbert-Yoder Doctrine 
When combined with other holdings of the Court, the ex-
traordinary protection of religious exercise afforded by the 
Sherbert-Yoder doctrine may have created a serious problem. In 
United States v. Ballard, 13 the Court had foreclosed judicial 
inquiry into the sincerity and reasonableness of religious be-
liefs. When read with Ballard, the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine 
appeared to require that a constitutional exemption from com-
pliance with the law be granted to any religious objector who 
asked for one. 14 
The mandate of free exercise exemptions that followed 
from the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine did not pose a serious difficul-
ty when the benefit to be gained from exemption was some-
thing few people would want, like receipt of unemployment 
benefits despite being unavailable for work on Saturday, or 
freedom from prosecution under compulsory school attendance 
laws. In United States v. Lee, 15 however, the Amish asked the 
Court to grant them a free exercise exemption from paying 
social security taxes. Perhaps fearing a tidal wave of exemption 
requests by people claiming that their religious beliefs pre-
vented them from paying any kind of tax at all, 16 the Court 
found the government's interest in denying the Amish an ex-
emption to be compelling. 
Lee marked the beginning of the end of the Sherbert-Yoder 
doctrine. After Lee, the Court denied free exercise relief to an 
orthodox Jew who sought to wear a yarmulke in violation of 
Air Force uniform regulations in Goldman v. Weinberger, 17 a 
Native American tribe which sought to prevent construction of 
1:1. :122 U.S. 7H (1944). 
14. William Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free 
ExPrcise Exemption, 40 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 357, 359 (1990). 
15. 4fifi U.S. 252 (1982). 
16. Stephen Pepper, Takinf.i the Free Exercise Clause Seriously, 1986 B.Y.U. L. 
REV. 299, :124-2fi. 
17. 47.~ U.S. fi03 (19H6). 
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a highway that would prevent them from worshipping in Lyng 
v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 18 and to 
a televangelist who objected to state taxation of Bible sales in 
Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization. 19 Survey-
ing these decisions, Mark Tushnet concluded that the Court 
was willing to protect religious exercise only when doing so 
either was relatively inexpensive or was otherwise consistent 
with secular constitutional norms like freedom of expression or 
due process of law. ~0 
D. Abandonment of the Sherbert-Yoder Doctrine 
In Employment Division v. Smith,21 the Court brought 
free exercise jurisprudence full circle by reaffirming the belief-
action doctrine of Reynolds. In Smith, a state denied two Na-
tive Americans unemployment compensation after they were 
dismissed from their jobs for smoking peyote as part of tribal 
religious rituals. Because use of peyote was a criminal offense 
under state law, the state ruled that the Native Americans had 
been dismissed for "work-related misconduct" which permitted 
benefits to be withheld. The Native Americans sued for the 
benefits, arguing that the free exercise clause prevented the 
state from applying the misconduct provision to them. 
The Court in Smith effectively abandoned the Sherbert-
Yoder doctrine. Noting that denial of unemployment compensa-
tion in Sherbert was not based on the plaintiffs commission of 
an illegal act, the Court held in Smith that the state's interest 
in ensuring the integrity of the unemployment insurance fund 
was sufficiently important to justify its refusal to pay benefits 
to claimants who were guilty of unlawful conduct. The majority 
opinion by Justice Scalia strictly confined Sherbert and its 
progeny to their facts, and recast Yoder from a free exercise 
opinion that protected freedom of religion into a substantive 
due process opinion that protected parental and family autono-
my. The opinion expressly stated that the only independent 
protection offered by the free exercise clause lay in its prohibi-
tion of laws motivated by a desire to disadvantage religion, on 
the theory that such laws impose on religious exercise an inten-
tional burden, rather than a merely incidental one. Even this 
1R. 4Rfi U.S. 4:-l~ (1~88). 
19. 49:-l U.S. :178, :192 (1990). 
20. Sr>r>, TUSIINET, supra note a, at 249. 
21. 494 U.S. 872, 8~0 (1990). 
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protection is redundant of other parts of the Constitution, how-
ever, since the Court had already held in Larson u. Valente22 
that legislation demonstrably intended to disadvantage particu-
lar religious denominations violates the establishment clause. 
Accordingly, Smith left the free exercise clause with no inde-
pendent content or effect, effectively repealing it. 
E. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Smith did approve the legislative practice of writing reli-
gious exemptions into laws, a practice which the Court had 
previously upheld.23 Thus, although there is no longer any 
such thing as a constitutionally compelled exemption under the 
free exercise clause, there still remains a constitutionally per-
missible exemption under the establishment clause. What this 
means is that politically powerful religions will be able to lobby 
successfully for exemptions from burdensome legislation in 
Congress and the state legislatures, while the free exercise of 
politically powerless religions-those most in need of constitu-
tional protection from the majoritarian political process-will 
be wholly dependent upon the goodwill of political majorities. 
Reynolds and Smith themselves are evidence that politically 
powerless religions will often fail to obtain legislative exemp-
tions for their religious practices. 
The current controversy over the proposed Religious Free-
dom Restoration Ace4 is a good example of how majoritarian 
politics can intrude upon the interests of minority religions. 
The Act is designed to re-establish the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine 
by statute. (So the reader can judge my biases, I disclose here 
that I am a supporter of the Act and have worked with LDS 
Public Communications to generate support for it.) Roman 
Catholics are opposing the Act in its present form because 
there is a possibility that it could be used to bolster abortion 
rights even if Roe v. Wade 25 is overturned. Now, I have gener-
ally admired Catholic activism on moral and social issues, but I 
can't help but think on this particular issue that if Catholicism 
were a minority religion it might give some higher priority to 
22. 456 U.S. 228, 25fi (1982). 
2a. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-day Saints v. Amos, 48::! U.S. 327 (1987). 
24. H.R. REP. No. 2797, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. REP. No. 2969, 102d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). 
25. 410 U.S. 113 (197:1). 
1 
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the Act. Because Catholics are politically powerful, however, 
they can afford to give politics a higher priority than survival. 
Those who have relatively little political power, like Mormons, 
probably make the calculus differently. 
Ill. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
A. Everson and the ((Wall of Separation" 
This shift from Protestantism to secularism that I've been 
discussing is evident in the Court's first establishment clause 
decision in the modern era, Everson v. Board of Education. 26 
In Everson, the Supreme Court considered whether a city could 
pay for the bus transportation of school-aged children to paro-
chial as well as to public schools. Along the way to holding that 
such funding was constitutionally permissible, the Court sum-
marized the principal force behind the drafting of the establish-
ment clause as the desire of the framers to eliminate the civil 
disorder and violent persecution that historically had accompa-
nied the establishment of a single sect. Observing that early 
American colonials had brought with them the European tradi-
tion of the established church, the Court stressed the insult 
and indignity of the fact that religious dissenters in America 
were compelled to support government churches whose princi-
pal aim was "to strengthen and consolidate the established 
faith by generating a burning hatred against dissenters.'m 
The Court stated that the establishment clause required an 
absolute neutrality on the part of government, both as between 
particular religions and as between religion and nonreligion. 
The decision closed with a flourish, quoting the Jefferson's now-
famous (or infamous) phrase to the effect that the establish-
ment clause "was intended to erect a 'wall of separation' be-
tween Church and State."28 
With Everson, the Supreme Court clearly signalled that the 
de facto establishment would be abandoned as a guide to the 
establishment clause. Although governmental neutrality among 
particular Protestant sects was consistent with the de facto 
establishment, governmental neutrality between Protestants 
and nonProtestants and between believers and atheists was 
antithetical to it. Likewise, although the institutional separa-
26. 330 u.s. 1 (1947). 
27. !d. at 10. 
28. !d. at 16. 
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tion of church and state was consistent with the de facto estab-
lishment, the more decisive political division implied by the 
"wall of separation" was not. 
Perhaps most important, neutrality and separation both 
bespeak a conception of religion that is private and unconnect-
ed to government and other institutions of public life. The de 
facto establishment was built on the premise that religion is 
essential to civilized society. By contrast, the modern require-
ment that government remain detached and neutral with re-
spect to the religious choices of its citizens suggests that a 
wholly secular society is not only possible, but even preferable. 
In this view, government can safely remain indifferent about 
how religious choice is exercised. 
B. The Erosion of Secular Neutrality 
One of the difficulties with secular neutrality is incoher-
ence. It's not too hard to conceptualize a government that is 
neutral among religions, but to say that government must be 
neutral between religion and nonreligion presents severe con-
ceptual difficulties. What is the position of neutrality between a 
proposition A and its negation, not-A? Or, to take an example a 
little closer to home, where is the neutral ground between pro-
choice and pro-life positions on abortion?29 
Of course, the Court's establishment doctrine has never 
been genuinely neutral, which is why I have chosen to call it 
secular neutrality. The Court proceeds on the modernist as-
sumption that public life is and ought to be secular. According-
ly, it is "neutral" with respect to religion only so long as it re-
mains confined to private life. Religion that manifests itself in 
public life is greeted with hostility. 
This dichotomy between public secularism and private 
religion worked fairly well until the later years of the Burger 
Court. By this time, the political composition of the Court had 
changed to the point that it was now willing to permit fairly 
substantial interactions between religion and government in 
public life. However, the Court did not alter its commitment to 
secular neutrality as the rhetorical touchstone for constitution-
ality under the establishment clause. The result was absurd 
29. The Supreme Court seems to have come as close as anyone to articulating 
a compromise position in Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 
(1992). 
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arguments by the Court that actions which seemed indisput-
ably religious were really not religious at all. 30 
In Lynch v. Donnelly,31 for example, the Court approved a 
creche or nativity scene which was owned by a city and dis-
played on city property every Christmas. Chief Justice Burger 
argued that because the creche merely celebrated Christmas 
and depicted its historical origins, it was a secular display, sort 
of like hanging Dali's Last Supper in the National Gallery.32 
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that use of 
the creche was secular in that it lent solemnity to an historical 
and cultural event.33 
In Bowen v. Kendrick,34 the Court refused to strike down 
a facial establishment clause attack on the Adolescent Family 
Life Act, which appropriated funds to social service agencies 
who developed programs directed at reducing teenage pregnan-
cy and teen sexual activity in general. A number of religious 
social service agencies received funds for programs centered 
around abstinence. The Court found that granting funds to 
these agencies was not a departure from secular neutrality 
because they were not "pervasively sectarian."35 
Now, I suppose its true that if one goes into LDS Social 
Services, the social welfare arm of the Mormon church, he or 
she will not be subjected to the Joseph Smith story, at least not 
right away, so in that sense the "sectarianism" of the agency is 
not "pervasive." But surely one gets very different counselling 
about sexual activity, birth control, pregnancy and adoption at 
LDS Social Services than at, say, Planned Parenthood or a 
state counselling agency. In fact, I am fully confident that one 
gets counselling at Social Services that is consistent with the 
LDS faith, and that is probably inconsistent with the most 
common secular ways of dealing with teenage sexual activity. 
Funding religious as well as secular approaches to this problem 
seems to get at neutrality, but remember, it is the commitment 
to secular neutrality, rather than neutrality simpliciter, that 
puts the Court in the position of having to argue that religious 
social service agencies are not really religious. 
30. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 267-68. 
31. 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
32. ld. at 681, 684. 
33. I d. at 687-94. 
34. 487 U.S. 589, 622 (1988). 
35. ld. at 624. 
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The same sort of dilemma presents itself in Lee v. 
Weisman, 36 the case in which the Supreme Court declared 
graduation prayer unconstitutional. Indeed, the Court's neu-
trality analysis virtually dictated the result, although I admit 
to being as surprised as anyone by the result. (Again, so that 
the reader can judge my biases, I disclose here that I believe 
graduation prayer is a bad idea both constitutionally and as a 
matter of policy.) 
The lower court in Weisman, in a burst of candor, conceded 
that the only reason the prayer was prohibited was because it 
was addressed to God. In other words, had the rabbi in that 
case simply expressed the prayer as his own personal senti-
ments, no establishment clause issue would have been raised. 
In order to preserve secular neutrality while upholding gradua-
tion prayer, the Court would have somehow had to characterize 
the prayer as secular, which would have generated the same 
problems as before, only in much sharper relief-one might be 
able to argue that a creche or a social service agency is not per-
vasively sectarian, but if a prayer isn't sectarian, then what is? 
Moreover, the validation of graduation prayer on the theory 
that prayer is a secular practice would be an iromc victory 
.indeed for religious conservatives.37 
IV. THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
One way of characterizing the evolution of the Court's 
religion clause doctrine over the past 100 years is that it has 
gone from a weak free exercise and a weak establishment 
clause under the de facto establishment, to a strong free exer-
a6. 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). 
a7. An alternative approach had been advocated by Justice KEnnedy, the author 
of the majority opinion in WPisman. In a concurring opinion in County of Allegheny 
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 57::!, 6fifi (19R9) (Kennedy, J., concurring), another creche case, 
Kennedy suggested abandoning neutrality for coercion as the rhetorical touchstone 
for the establishment clause. In other words, an interaction between religion and 
government would not be considered a violation of the establishment clause unless 
there was some element of government coercion of religious belief or practice 
inherent in the action. Thus, another option for the Court, and the one anticipated 
by most commentators, would have been to find that graduation prayers, short and 
platitudinous as they typically are, and given in a public ceremonial context with 
parents and friends present, are not either actually or potentially coercive. Al-
though Justice Kennedy spent considerable time disc"Ussing the coercive effects of 
graduation prayer in Weisman, see 112 S. Ct. at 26.58-2fifil, he explicitly reaffirmed 
the Lemon test as the appropriate means of determining constitutionality under the 
establishment clause, see 112 S. Ct. at 265fi. 
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cise and a strong establishment clause under the regime of 
secular neutrality, and is now on the way back to a weak free 
exercise and a weak establishment clause under the Rehnquist 
Court.38 
The Supreme Court has held that federal constitutional 
standards are in effect the minimum standards that the states 
must adhere to, but that they are free to institute more vigor-
ous protections of individual rights if they so choose.39 Accord-
ingly, a state which chooses to constitutionalize as a matter of 
state law a strong free exercise clause and a strong establish-
ment clause seems free to do so. 
What I find interesting is that Utah seems to have such a 
constitutional provision already. The language in section 4 is 
absolutist for both free exercise and non-establishment 
rights. 4° Free exercise rights can never be infringed, which 
suggests that even compelling state interests may not justify 
violations of religious freedom. Moreover, there can be no union 
of church and state, or any funding for any religious worship, 
or any "domination" or "interference" by a church with respect 
to state government.41 
This creates some very interesting interpretive possibilities 
with respect to abortion and graduation prayer. If a woman can 
persuade a court that her religion requires her as a matter of 
conscience to have an abortion in circumstances in which cur-
rent law does not permit an abortion, then the text of section 4 
would seem to require that she be exempted from the law and 
38. Cf Ira C. Lupu, ThP Troublr> With Accomodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
743 (1992). 
39. E.f?., PruncYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
40. See UT. CONST. art. I, § 4: 
The rights of conscience shall never be infringed. The State shall make 
no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; no religious test shall be required as a qualification for 
any office of public trust or for any vote at any election; nor shall any 
person be incompetent as a witness or juror on account of religious belief 
or the absence thereof. There shall be no union of Church and State, nor 
shall any church dominate the State or interfere with its functions. No 
public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any 
religious worship, exercise or instruction, or for the support of any ecclesi-
astical establishment. No property qualification shall be required of any 
person to vote, or hold office, except as provided in this Constitution. 
41. The legislative history of this provision is contained in OFFICIAL REPORT OF 
THE PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION 46, 212-51 passim, ::l63-65, 
806-07, 1855-72 pat<sim (Star Printing, 1898). 
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be permitted to obtain an abortion outside the statutory excep-
tions. Similarly, if one can show that public prayers in Utah 
are virtually always given by LDS people in the LDS style, 
then there would seem to be a strong argument that this con-
stitutes interference or domination of the public function by a 
particular denomination, or perhaps even the funding of reli-
gious worship. Although litigation on both issues is suspended 
for the moment in light of recent Supreme Court decisions, one 
would expect them to resurface again in some form or another 
given the depth of feeling on both sides of both issues. 
Now, it is hard for me to believe that Utah state court 
judges will interpret those provisions in the way I have de-
scribed; they have not done so in the past, and contemporary 
political realities are simply against it. Nevertheless, these are 
live interpretive possibilities, which are likely to become even 
more vigorously pressed as the ACLU develops state law argu-
ments in its challenges to restrictive abortion laws and public 
prayer. I have no idea how these challenges will turn out, but I 
will suggest that the most politically interesting religion clause 
controversies of the next few years may be not be centered in 
Washington, but in Salt Lake City. 
